

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

SR/3/PP

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. C/SR/3/PP				
2.				
3.				
4. C/SR/3		31 JAN	4M	
5.				
6. SJM RIO/CN		6 JAN 1960	6 JAN 1960	DH
7.		7 JAN 1960	7 JAN 1960	DH
8.				
9.				
10. RI/DP				
11.				
12.				
13. SR/3-PP				
14.				
15.	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B			
16.	NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007			
17.				
18.				

**RECORD COPY**

Final copy is attached

13. For filing

Marshall  
Co 5/8~~KAROK~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS		AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME	OFFICE	NAME	TITLE
ENCLOSURE		ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
			74-124-29/3
		INDEX	
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
		15 JAN 1960	EGMW-8642

<b>DISPATCH</b>		<b>KAPOK SECRET</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>KAPOK</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. <b>EGMW 8642</b>
TO	Chief of Base, Munich Attn: [ ] COS, Germany			HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <b>74-124-29/3</b>
INFO				
FROM	Chief, SR <b>KEDWOOD/AERODYNAMIC</b> Follow-up on Operational Lead from Marzahines			DATE <b>1 JAN 1960</b>
SUBJECT				RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED	Comments			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)	<p>A. EGMW 45273, 15 October 1959  B. DIR 07419,</p> <p>1. Reference A was read with interest here at Headquarters, particularly your comments on techniques of approach to Soviets by emigres, on the one hand, and PRINTERs on the other. (We should imagine that Soviet attitudes toward third nationals of Western or Central Europe would closely approximate those shown to PRINTERs.) It is agreed that the "frontal attack" technique most often used by the emigres alerts the Soviet security chaperone and perhaps embarrasses the target. Emigres might well reconsider their techniques of approach with a view to achieving greater subtlety, particularly those emigre agents over whom KUBARK control is exerted. At the same time, however, the difficulties of meeting Soviets privately at all in the limited time available are formidable. At least to some extent then, we are saddled with this frontal type of approach with all its frustrations and weaknesses. It can at least be hoped that some of the uncontrolled emigre activity serves as a screen for more sophisticated operations on the part of both controlled emigre assets and KUBARK. It can also be argued, purely from a KUCAGE point of view, that exposing Soviets to exchanges of opinion and passing them literature are worthwhile ends in themselves. It can only be added that we need not be satisfied with this type of approach alone and should strive to use less direct means of access when opportunities allow, especially as our contact personnel, particularly emigre, become more familiar to the Soviets.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>USSR</i></p> <p>2. The names of Vasyl Ivanovich MALYNYUK (POB Stanislav, Ukrainian SSR; DOB unknown) or Vasyl SEMOTIUK (DOB 5 August 1932, Stanislav, Ukrainian SSR) and ANDREY Pavlovich GOROZHANKIN (DOB 9 November 1919 in Kharkov) have been put on the SR target list. (See "comments" of Case Number 1, EGMW 8992, which explains the function of the Target List.) As you pointed out in Reference A, GOROZHANKIN appears to be a patriotic Ukrainian and a potential target. MALYNYUK made a similar impression, not only on ARCASSOWARY/6, but on four other members of the ARCASSOWARY/1 contact team whose reports were received by Headquarters via ARCASSOWARY/2. Furthermore, MALYNYUK did give ARCASSOWARY/6 an address in apparent expectation of overt correspondence. Serious consideration was given at Headquarters to attempting an immediate follow-up to MALYNYUK via an internally mailed letter ostensibly from ARCASSOWARY/6, but in the end it was decided that there were too many unknown facts and factors and that we would be wiser to discard the plan in the hope that there will be another opportunity to assess MALYNYUK, either abroad or perhaps even inside the USSR. In line with Reference B, it is suggested that ARCASSOWARY/6 not write to MALYNYUK through open mail for reasons which are apparent.</p> <p>3. Headquarters can offer no clarification of the confusion as to whether MALYNYUK is SEMOTIUK or vice versa. It seems that visa information received from [ ] frequently is incomplete and has gaps which occur when visas are requested from USSR cities other than Moscow. However, our confusion seems at least partly self-induced. From all reports MALYNYUK never claimed to be SEMOTIUK; this was our assumption. And he did give his name and address as MALYNYUK to ARCASSOWARY/6 for the purpose of receiving mail. Whatever the truth, we do not know enough of it now to come to a dependable conclusion as to whether the contamination is lack of it based on this factor.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>USSR</i></p> <p>THIS DOCUMENT EXPIRES ON <u>Indefinitely</u> AT THE TIME THE DOCUMENT IS TO BE WARDED TO THE READING REFERENCE SECTION FOR APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION.</p> <p><b>CS COPY</b></p> <p>Distribution: 2 - Addressee; 2 - COS</p> <p>FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. 10-57 (40) REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.</p> <p>RECORD COPY (SIGNATURE) (UNIRECORD COPY)</p>			

